The Attack on Pearl Harbour – Part 2
Summarised from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Japan and the United States engaged in negotiations during 1941 in an attempt to improve relations. In the course of these negotiations, Japan offered to withdraw from most of China and Indochina after making peace with the Nationalist government. It also proposed to adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and to refrain from trade discrimination, provided all of the other nations reciprocated. Washington rejected these proposals. The Japanese Prime Minister, Konoye, then offered to meet with President Roosevelt, but Roosevelt insisted on reaching an agreement before any meeting. The United States ambassador to Japan repeatedly urged Roosevelt to agree to the meeting, warning that it was the only way to preserve the conciliatory Konoye government and peace in the Pacific. However, the ambassador’s recommendation was not acted upon. The Konoye government collapsed the following month, and the Japanese military then rejected a withdrawal of all troops from China.
Japan’s final proposal, delivered on the 20th of November, offered to withdraw from southern Indochina and to refrain from attacks in Southeast Asia, so long as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands supplied one million gallons of aviation fuel, lifted their sanctions against Japan, and ceased aid to China. The American counter-proposal of the 26th of November (the 27th of November in Japan), commonly known as the “Hull Note”, required Japan to completely evacuate China without conditions and conclude non-aggression pacts with the Pacific powers. On the 26th of November in Japan, the day before the delivery of the “Hull Note”, the Japanese task force left port for Pearl Harbour.
The Japanese intended the attack as a preventive action to keep the United States Pacific Fleet from interfering with its planned military actions in Southeast Asia against the overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Over the course of seven hours, there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island held by the United States and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Additionally, from the Japanese viewpoint, it was seen as a preventive strike “before the oil gauge ran empty”.
Military planning
Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbour to protect the move into the “Southern Resource Area” (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early in 1941 under the supervision of Admiral Yamamoto, who was then commanding Japan’s Combined Fleet. He was given approval from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff for the formal planning and training of an attack only after a great deal of arguing with Naval Headquarters, including threating to resign his command. Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941. The planners intensively studied the 1940 British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto.
Over the next several months, pilots were trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations, Emperor Hirohito did not approve the attack plan until the 5th of November, after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the matter. Final authorization was not given by the emperor until the 1st of December, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him that the “Hull Note” would “destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea”.
By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent. A Gallup poll just before the attack on Pearl Harbour found that 52 percent of Americans expected war with Japan, 27 percent did not, and 21 percent had no opinion. While United States Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, United States officials doubted that Pearl Harbour would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat posed to sea lanes by the air bases located throughout the Philippines and the naval base at Manila, as well as the threat to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territories to the south of the Philippines. The Americans also incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.
Objectives
The Japanese attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with the Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya and to enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference. Second, Japan hoped to buy time to consolidate its position and to increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the United States Two-Ocean Navy Act in 1940 eliminated any chance of victory. Third, in order to deliver a blow to the ability of the United States to mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were chosen as the main targets as they were the most prestigious ships of any navy at the time. Finally, Japan hoped that the attack would undermine American morale so much that the United States Government would seek a compromise peace with Japan and drop its demands that were contrary to Japanese interests.
Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbour carried two distinct disadvantages: firstly, the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them; and, secondly, most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbour. A further important disadvantage was the absence from Pearl Harbour of all three of the United States Pacific Fleet’s aircraft carriers (the USS Enterprise, the USS Lexington, and the USS Saratoga). This was known to the Japanese. The Imperial Japanese Navy top command embraced Admiral Mahan’s “decisive battle” doctrine, especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press ahead.
Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war also meant other targets in the harbour, especially the navy yard, the oil tank farms, and the submarine base, were ignored, because they thought that the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt.
Approach and attack
On the 26th of November, 1941, a Japanese task force of six aircraft carriers left the Kuril Islands in the north of Japan to travel to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbour. 360 aircraft would be used for the two attack waves and 48 aircraft would be on defensive combat air patrol, including nine fighters from the first wave.
The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to attack the carriers as its first objective and the cruisers as its second objective, and finally the battleships as its third objective. The first wave carried most of the weapons necessary to attack the large warships, mainly specially adapted Type 91 aerial torpedoes which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water. The aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets (battleships and aircraft carriers) or, if these were not present, any other high value ships (cruisers and destroyers). The first wave dive bombers were to attack ground targets. The fighter planes were ordered to bombard and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get into the air to intercept the bombers, especially in the first wave. When their fuel got low, the fighter planes were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and return to combat. The fighter planes were to serve combat air patrol duties where needed, especially over the United States airfields.
Before the attack commenced, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched reconnaissance floatplanes from two cruisers with orders to report on United States fleet composition and location. The reconnaissance aircraft flights risked alerting the United States and were not necessary. The United States fleet composition and information about the preparedness of Pearl Harbour were already known due to reports from a Japanese spy.
Submarines
Five fleet submarines each embarked a Type A midget submarine for transport to the waters off Oahu. The five submarines left Japan on the 25th of November, 1941. On the 6th of December, they came within 10 nautical miles (which is 19 kilometres or 12 miles) of the mouth of Pearl Harbour and launched their midget submarines at about 01:00 local time on the 7th of December. At 03:42 Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper Condor spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbour entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer Ward. The midget submarine may have entered Pearl Harbour. However, the Ward sank another midget submarine at 06:37 in the first American shots in the Pacific Theatre. A midget submarine on the north side of Ford Island missed the Seaplane Tender Curtiss with her first torpedo and missed the attacking destroyer Monaghan with her other torpedo before being sunk by the Monaghan at 08:43.
A third midget submarine grounded twice, once outside the harbour entrance and once again on the east side of Oahu, where it was captured on the 8th of December. A submarine officer became the first Japanese prisoner of war when he swam ashore and was captured by an Hawaii National Guard Corporal. A fourth midget submarine had been damaged by a depth charge attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its torpedoes. Japanese forces received a radio message from a midget submarine at 00:41 on the 8th of December claiming damage to one or more large warships inside Pearl Harbour.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
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