The Attack on Pearl Harbour – Part 3
Summarised from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In 1992, 2000, and 2001, submersibles operated by the Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory found the wreck of the fifth midget submarine lying in three parts outside Pearl Harbour. The wreck was in the debris field where a lot of surplus United States equipment was dumped after the war, including vehicles and landing craft. Both of its torpedoes were missing. This correlates with reports of two torpedoes fired at the light cruiser St. Louis at 10:04 at the entrance of Pearl Harbour, and a possible torpedo fired at the destroyer, Helm, at 08:21.
Japanese declaration of war
The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto’s intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an end. However, the attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the five thousand word notification (commonly called the “Fourteen Part Message”) in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. It took the Japanese ambassador too long to transcribe the message and he could not deliver it on schedule. It was not presented until more than an hour after the attack began. In fact, United States code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before the ambassador was scheduled to deliver it. The final part is sometimes described as a declaration of war. While this final part was viewed by a number of senior United States Government and military officials as a very strong indicator that negotiations were likely to be terminated and that war might break out at any moment, it neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations. A declaration of war was printed on the front pages of the evening editions of Japan’s newspapers on the 8th of December (late on the 7th of December in the United States), but the declaration of war was not delivered to the United States Government until the day after the attack.
For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without first formally breaking diplomatic relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to Washington. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at the International Christian University in Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the Japanese Government over how, and indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan’s intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including an entry on the 7th of December in the war diary saying, “our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success”. Commenting on this, Professor Iguchi writes, “the diary shows that the army and the navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations … and they clearly prevailed”.
In any event, even if the Japanese had decoded and delivered the “Fourteen Part Message” before the beginning of the attack, it would not have constituted either a formal break of diplomatic relations or a declaration of war. The final two paragraphs of the message effectively reads:
“Thus the hope of the Japanese Government to improve Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote peace in the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to notify the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it considers that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.”
First wave composition
The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu. Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties. The first attack included three groups of planes:
• The First Group targeted battleships and aircraft carriers and consisted of 49 bombers in four sections armed with 800-kilogram armour-piercing bombs and 40 bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes also in four sections. One bomber failed to launch.
• The Second Group targeted Ford Island and Wheeler Field and consisted of 51 dive bombers armed with 249-kilogram general-purpose bombs. Three dive bombers failed to launch.
• The Third Group targeted aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, and Kaneohe and consisted of 43 Mitsubishi fighter planes for air control and bombarding. Two fighter planes failed to launch.
As the first wave approached Oahu, it was detected by the United States Army radar at Opana Point near the island’s northern tip. This post had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational. The operators reported a target, but the newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Centre assumed it was the scheduled arrival of six B-17 Flying Fortress bombers from California. The Japanese planes were approaching from a direction very close to the bombers (a difference of only a few degrees), and while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell the officer how large it was. For security reasons, the officer could not tell the operators that six B-17s were due, even though it was widely known.
As the first wave planes approached Oahu, they encountered and shot down several United States aircraft. At least one of these aircraft radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbour entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the attacking planes began bombing and machine-gunning. Nevertheless, it is not clear that any warnings would have had much effect even if they had been interpreted correctly and in good time. The results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbour, even though MacArthur had almost nine hours warning following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.
The air portion of the attack began at 7:48 a.m. Hawaiian Time with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353 Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present, namely the battleships, while dive bombers attacked United States air bases across Oahu, starting with the largest air base Hickam Field, and Wheeler Field, the main United States Army Air Forces fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked Bellows Field near Kaneohe occupied by the Army Air Forces and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of Curtiss P-36 Hawks, Curtiss P-40 Warhawks, and some Douglas Dauntless dive bombers from the Carrier Enterprise.
In the first wave attack, about eight of the forty-nine 800-kilogram armour-piercing bombs hit their intended battleship targets. At least two of those bombs broke up on impact, another detonated before penetrating an unarmoured deck, and one was a dud. Thirteen of the forty torpedoes hit battleships, and four torpedoes hit other ships. Men aboard the United States ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting bleary-eyed men to dress as they ran to battle stations. The famous message, “AIRRAID ON PEARL HARBOUR X THIS IS NO DRILL”, was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond. The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft were parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to prevent sabotage, and guns were unmanned. None of the Navy’s naval guns and only a quarter of the Navy’s machine guns got into action. Only four of the 31 Army batteries got into action. Despite this low alert status, many American military personnel responded effectively during the attack. Aboard the Nevada, an officer commanded the ship’s anti-aircraft guns and was severely wounded, but he continued to be on post. While a lieutenant commander commanded the Nevada in the absence of the captain and got her under way until the ship was grounded at 9:10 a.m. One of the destroyers, theAylwin, got under way with only four officers aboard, none of them with more than a year’s sea duty; she operated at sea for 36 hours before her commanding officer managed to get back aboard. The captain of the West Virginia led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit the Tennessee, moored alongside.
Second wave composition
The second planned wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 bombers, 81 dive bombers, and 36 fighter planes. Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties. This wave and its targets also comprised three groups of planes:
• The First Group consisted of 54 bombers armed with 249-kilogram and 60-kilogram general-purpose bombs. 27 bombers targeted the aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barber’s Point. 27 bombers targeted the hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field.
• The Second Group targeted aircraft carriers and cruisers. 78 dive bombers armed with 249-kilogram general purpose bombs in four sections. Three bombers aborted.
• The Third Group targeted the aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, and Kaneohe. 35 Mitsubishi fighter planes were deployed for defence and bombarding. One plane aborted.
The second wave was divided into three groups. One group was tasked to attack Kaneohe, the other groups were tasked to attack Pearl Harbour itself. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several directions.
American casualties and damage
The attack was over, ninety minutes after it began. 2,008 sailors were killed and 710 others were wounded; 218 soldiers and airmen were killed and 364 were wounded; 109 marines were killed and 69 were wounded; finally 68 civilians were killed and 35 were wounded. In total, 2,403 Americans were killed and 1,143 Americans were wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five battleships. All of the Americans killed or wounded during the attack were legally non-combatants as there was no state of war when the attack occurred.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
Lexikon, Polska